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This study investigates the shifts between individual and group per- 
formance in a choice dilemma, a gambling, and a Bayesian likelihood ratio 
estimation task. Twenty seven male subjects performed each task alone. 
Six four-man leaderless groups were formed and repeated the each task. 
Three subjects performed the task alone a second time. Finally, all 27 sub- 
jeers repeated each task again alone. The choice dilemma task decisions re- 
produced previously found patterns of shifts. Groups preferred higher 
variance gambles than did the average of pregroup individuals. The post- 
group likelihood ratio estimates of 22 of the 24 test subjects resembled their 
group's estimates more closely than they resembled their own pregroup 
estimates. Both group and individual correlations between measures of per- 
formance in all three tasks were low. 
INTRODUCTION 
Some investigations have shown tha~ groups make riskier decisions 
than individuals do. Stoner (1961) called this phenomenon "Lhe risky 
shift." Specifically, if unanimous group decisions are more risky than 
the average of the initial individual decisions, the group exhibits a 
risky shift. Brown (1965), Burnstein (1969), and I(ogan and Wallach 
(1967) have reviewed this topic. In most experiments, Ss initially per- 
form the tasks alone, then repeat it in a group, and then repeat it again 
alone; this is an individual-group-individual (I-G-I) design. A consistent 
finding in I-G-I studies is that final (postgroup) individual decisions 
conform more closely to the decisions of the group than to the initial 
(pregroup) individual decisions. 
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The choice dilemma paradigm has been the usual task. In this paradigm, 
the individual or group acts as an advisor in hypothetical decisions. Only 
in studies by Lonergan and 3/IcClintock (1961), Pruitt and Teger (1969), 
Rettig (1966), Wallaeh, Kogan, and Bem (19'64) have Ss won or lost 
money (or experienced other real consequences) as a result of their de- 
cisions. Whether risky shifts will occur in real life situations is still an 
open question. 
Thus far differences between individuals and groups in decision making 
have been studied only in action selection tasks. This study, using a 
within-S design, examines the differences between individuals and groups 
in two different action selection tasks and in one inference task. This 
kind of design permits the exploration of differences in performance 
between the same individuals and groups within several different tasks. 
I t  also permits a study of the interrelationships between performance on 
the different tasks within individuals and groups. 
Bayes's theorem is the optimal rule to use in order to revise one's 
prior opinions about the states of nature (Edwards, Lindman, and Savage, 
1963). In its odds-likelihood ratio form, it expresses the impact of a new 
datum on prior opinion as a (set of) likelihood ratios (LRs). The main 
advantage of estimating an LR rather than the separate probabilities or 
likelihoods is that an LR measures only those features of a datum that 
are relevant to the hypotheses being considered. Edwards, Phillips, Hays, 
and Goodman (1968) have proposed a diagnostic system, PIP, based on 
LR estimates. 
An information processor is called conservative when his posterior 
opinion differs from his prior opinion less than Bayes's theorem 
prescribes. A great deal of research has shown that in certain situations 
people are conservative. Reviews of this literature can be found in 
DuCharme (1969), Edwards (1968), and Peterson and Beach (1967). 
The issue remains: Are groups more or less conservative than individuals 
in an inference task? In the foregoing context, this study considers three 
questions: (1) Will a risky shift occur in an action selection task in 
which the participants bet their own money? (2) Does individual or 
group behavior in several tasks that might all be supposed to require 
responses to "risk" show the kind of coherence that would permit the 
assumption of a general risk-seeking or risk-avoid trait? (3) Are indi- 
viduals more or less conservative than groups? 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Subjects were 27 male volunteers, 17 graduate students and 10 under- 
graduates from several disciplines, but none were psychology majors. 
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Subjects were paid $30 plus their winnings or minus their losses from 
the gambling task. 
Tasks 
Three tasks were used in order to contrast decisions of individuals and 
groups in action selection and LR estimation, and to search for a pos- 
sible underlying phenomenon of risk preference. 
1. Choice dilemma task. I selected the same twelve choice dilemma 
situations as used by Stoner (1968) to determine a S's (or group's) 
preferences in hypothetical situations. In each problem, an imaginary 
person must choose between two acts. The risky action, if successful, 
produces a high payoff, and if  unsuccessful, a low one. The sure thing 
produces an intermediate payoff. The subject must "advise" the imagi- 
nary decision maker what the lowest probability of success is for which 
the risky act should be chosen. Stoner (1968) summarizes the twelve 
situations. 
2. Likelihood ra~io estimation taslc. I used a task devised by Ward 
Edwards and Gloria Wheeler (unpublished) to compare Ss' and groups' 
LR judgments. This task uses seven-inch sticks. Each stick has a blue 
and a yellow part. The blue and yellow occur in various proportions in 
different sticks. The Ss are shown two blue and yellow colored drawings, 
each of a sample of approximately 100 sticks from one of the populations 
being considered. Populations A and B have Gaussian (normal) dis- 
tributions with mean lengths of blue of 4.5 inches and 2.5 inches, re- 
spectively. Each population has a standard deviation of 1.25 inches of 
blue. To prepare the drawings the cumulative normal distribution for 
each population was divided into 100 equally likely parts. 1//100 of the 
population falls between every two division or boundary points. The 
mean lengths of blue at the boundary points, randomly rearranged, com- 
prise the drawing that displays each population. Three lengths are 
missing from each drawing because it was too difficult to produce the 
very small amounts of color required to represent the boundary points 
at the tails of the distribution. Thus each drawing is a picture of a 
random arrangement of what looks like a sample from a normal dis- 
tribution but in fact has been chosen so that the "sample" precisely 
depicts the population. A line is drawn across each drawing showing the 
population mean. The Ss are told that each drawing shows a random 
sample of sticks from its population, even though this was not the case. 
After suitable instruction, S sees a partly blue-partly yellow stick. 
With the drawings representing the two populations as guides, he is asked 
to state from which population (A or B) this stick is more likely to 
have been sampled and, in a ratio form, how much more likely. This is 
a likelihood ratio estimate. It is repeated with 80 different sticks. 
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TABLE 1 
TI-IE GAMBLES COMPRISING THE GAMBLING GAME s 
S(5) S(lO) S(15) S(20) S(25) 
($1, --90¢) ($1, --80¢) ($1.50, --$1.20) (82, --1.60) (82.50, --$2) 
(500, --40¢) (600, --400) ($1, --700) ($1, --60¢) ($1.50, --$1) 
(30¢,--200) (500, --30) (70¢, --40¢) (800, --40¢) ($1, --50¢) 
(250,--150) (400, --200) (500, --20¢) (60¢, --20¢) (800, --30¢) 
(200, --100) (300, --100) (400, --100) (500, --100) (65¢, --150) 
(150, -50) (25¢, -5¢) (350, -5¢) (450, -50) (550, -50) 
(50,50) (10~,100) (150,150) (20¢,20¢) (250,250) 
The flip of a coin determines the outcome of a gamble (heads wins, tails loses). The 
first number of each pair is the amount to be won if that gamble is played and a head 
comes up. The second number of each pair is the amount to be lost. 
3. Gambling task. I selected the gambles designed by Coombs and 
Huang (1970) to determine a S's (or groups') preference in a gambling 
situation. Ss or groups are shown, one set at a time, the five sets of seven 
gambles displayed in Table  1. They  are asked to rank order from most 
to least preferred the seven gambles within each set. Following this, the 
most preferred choice from one of the sets is randomly selected and 
played. The flip of a coin determines the outcome. The Ss are given 
money to wager, but  they could lose more than they are given. 
Procedure 
The first three of the nine sessions of the experiment were individual; 
the second three were group; the l a s t  three were individual again. In  
sessions 1, 4, and 7, Ss performed the choice dilemma task. In sessions 
2, 5, and 8, they performed the LR  task. And in sessions 3, 6, and 9, 
they performed the gambling task. Ss worked at their own pace, and 
were not given prior information about the I -G-I  design. 
Twenty  four test Ss did the tasks alone and in groups. These test Ss 
were randomly assigned into four:man, leadership groups. Three Ss 
were individual controls, performing each task three times alone. There 
were no group controls. 
The groups were formed after  the initial individual sessions and re- 
mained unchanged. Each group sat around a desk. There was no fixed 
seating arrangement. Group sessions were tape recorded with Ss' knowl- 
edge. E remained present and answered only procedural questions. 
Unanimous decisions were required. 
:For the choice dilemma task, the pre- and postgroup individual de- 
cisions were made outside the laboratory. Subjects were given the 
problems with instruction not to discuss the material. The three control 
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DECISIONS 125 
Ss performed the first and third sets of problems at leisure, and the 
second performance in the laboratory. For each pmblem, S checked the 
lowest probability for which he would advise taking 4he higher risk 
alternative. During the group session, each S received ,a booklet con- 
taining the choice dilemma problems. They discussed each problem until 
they reached a unanimous decision. Each man recorded the group de- 
cisions in his booklet. Three weeks intervened between successive choice 
dilemma sessions. 
Each S was individually trained to estimate LRs. This instruction 
typically took 30 minutes to an hour. The training consisted of a written 
explanation, with examples, of the inferential process, followed by actual 
example tasks, with feedback of the correct values. In the last example 
task the S estimated LRs for five data which might have been sampled 
from either of two Gaussian (normal) distributions. One distribution 
was the heights, in stocking feet, of an empirical sample of American 
men between the ages of 18 and 79; the other was the same for American 
women. For each datum the S first estimated whether that height was 
more likely to have been sampled from the population of men, or the 
population of women. Then he estimated how much more likely in a 
ratio sense. The experimenter presented all five data before giving any 
feedback. The five heights were presented in the following order: 5'2", 
6'1", 5'6", 5'8", and zY10". The corresponding correct LRs are 1:10, 
725:1, 1.3:1, 7.5:1, and 1:120. I explained to S the specific task using 
blue and yellow sticks when I felt satisfied that he understood how to 
estimate LRs. 
The LR estimation procedure was as follows. The S was shown 80 
sticks, one at a time, in a special holder that presented the entire length 
of blue and fellow against a white background. The subject decided 
whether a stick was more likely to have been sampled from the pre- 
dominantly blue or the predominantly yellow population. Then he de- 
cided how much more likely in a ratio sense. The subject recorded both 
responses (qualitative and quantitative) on a sheet of paper. When S 
turned the paper over, E removed that stick from the holder, placed it 
out of sight, and put the next stick into the holder. The order in which 
the sticks were presented never  changed. The individual and group 
sessions were performed in the same manner. The groups discussed each 
stimulus. When a unanimous decision was reached, each person recorded 
the value on a sheet of paper. Three weeks intervened between the pre- 
group individual sessions and the group session and two weeks between 
the group session and the postgroup individual sessions. The same rela- 
tive spacing occurred for the individual sessions of the control Ss. 
A brief explanation of the gambling task format preceded the initial 
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individual sessions. All the individual gambling sessions followed the 
same procedure. Each S received $1.50 when he first arrived. He was 
told that one gamble would be played at the end of the session, and that 
this would be selected at random from his most preferred choices among 
the different sets of gambles. He was given, however, the option of 
selecting his second most preferred choice, if the possible loss from his 
first choice was greater than $1.50. Then S was handed five decks of 
IBM cards, with one gamble printed on each card. The random order 
within a deck was held constant throughout the experiment. The  decks 
were given one at a time in order of increasing wager. Within each deck, 
S was asked to rank order the gambles from most to least preferred. When 
S finished the rank orderings, a gamble was randomly selected, played, 
and the appropriate payoff was made. 
At the  beginning of the group sessions each member received $1.50. 
The E explained that the one gamble to be played at the end of the 
experiment would be selected in the same manner as it had been in the 
individual sessions. Each person stood to win or lose the full amount of 
the gamble finally selected. The sets of gambles were given one at a 
time to each person. When the group arrived at a unanimous preference 
ranking, each member arranged his cards according to the group de- 
cision and then turned these cards over to E, who handed out the next 
deck of cards. When groups finished the rank orderings, a gamble was 
randomly selected, played, and the appropriate payoffs made. Two of the 
six groups consisted of three Ss instead of four. The two Ss who did not 
attend their respective group sessions served as additional control Ss for 
this task. Three weeks intervened between the pregroup individual and 
group sessions. There was a two-week interval between the group and 
postgroup individual sessions. This same spacing was maintained for the 
control Ss. 
RESULTS 
Changes Between Pregroup Individual Per]ormance 
and Group Per]orrnance 
The Choice Dilemma Tasl~ 
Both risky and cautious shifts occurred. A risky shift is a positive 
difference resulting from the subtraction of the group Risk Score from 
the pregroup average individual Risk Score. A negative difference in 
the same subtraction defines a cautions shift. Table 2 summarizes the 
mean shifts in the performance of the six four-man groups compared 
to pregroup individual performance. 
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TABLE 2 
SUMMARY OF THE GROUP SHIFTS ON THE CHOICE DILEMNA PROBLEMS 
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Mean [of the Number of 
pregroup Number of groups 
average groups showing 
Problem individual] Mean group Mean showing cautious 
• number Risk Scores" I~isk Scores shift t risky shift shift 
1 6.41 5.50 .91 1.22 4 2 
2 5.62 6.00 --.38 .34 3 3 
3 3.17 1.67 1.50 2.51 5 1 
4 3.67 3.17 .50 .69 3 3 
5 2.83 2.67 .16 .33 3 3 
6 4.54 3.83 .71 .85 3 3 
7 4.12 3.67 .45 .86 4 2 
8 8.29 9.33 --1~04 2.87* 1 5 
9 2.67 1.17 1.50 3.05* 5 1 
10 3.33 3.00 .33 .39 2 3 
11 6.08 5.83 .25 .37 3 3 
12 6.00 5.83 .17 .20 3 3 
Total 39 32 
Risk Score equals probability of success multiplied by 10.0. 
* p < .05 two-tail t test. 
Stoner (1968) found, for the same task with a larger sample, 30-33 
groups of 4-7 members, statistically significant risky shifts in problems 
3-5, 7, 9, and 10, and statistically significant cautious shifts in problems 
2 and 8. The mean pregroup individual Risk Scores obtained in this 
study resembled his. The Pearson product~moment correlation between 
these scores, listed in Table 2, and the mean Risk Scores in his study 
was .95. Moreover, the direction of the shifts coincided with Stoner's 
findings, even though most of the shifts in this study were not statistically 
significant. The Pearson-product-moment correlation between the twelve 
mean shifts, across groups, in the two studies was .84. Thus there is 
excellent qualitative agreement between these two sets of results. 
The Gambling Task~ 
The riskiest gamble, the one with the greatest possible loss within 
each set, is scored 1, the next 2, etc., until 7. The number corresponding 
to the S's most preferred choice in a set is called the Level of Risk Score 
(LOR) for that  set. A risky shift is a positive difference resulting from 
the subtraction of the group L 0 R  from the pregroup average individual 
LOR. A negative difference in the same subtraction defines a cautious 
shift. Table 3 summarizes the mean shifts in the performance of the 
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TABLE 3 
SUMMARY OF THE MEAN LEVI~L OF ~ I S K  SCORES AND THE GROU]? SHIFTS FOR 
THE GAMBLING TASK 
Mean [of the 
pregroup Number of 
average Number of groups 
individual] Mean group groups showing 
Level of Level of Mean showing cautious 
Set Risk score s Risk score shift t risky shift shift 
S(5) 4.08 2.83 1.25 1.29 5 1 
S(10) 3.92 3.17 .75 .69 3 2 
S(15) 3.95 2.50 1.45 1.68 4 2 
S(20) 4.03 2.00 2.03 3.02* 5 1 
S(25) 4.36 2.67 1.69 2.91" 5 1 
Two of the six groups have 3 members each, the other four groups have four members 
each. 
* p < .05, two-tail t test. 
groups.  A l t h o u g h  bo th  r i s k y  a n d  cau t ious  shif ts  were found in al l  sets  of 
gambles ,  the  m e a n  sh i f t  was  r i sky .  Cons ide r ing  on ly  the  f o u r - m e m b e r  
groups ,  the re  were  18 ins tances  of r i s k y  shif t ,  one ins tance  of a cau t ious  
shif t ,  and  one ins tance  of no shif t .  
The Likelihood Ratio Estimation Task 3 
T h e  G r o u p  C o n s e r v a t i o n  Score (GCS)  is the  s lope of the  regress ion  
l ine r e l a t ing  the  group log l ike l ihood  ra t ios  ( L L R )  to the  p reg roup  
ave rage  i n d i v i d u a l s  L L R s  where  the  i n d i v i d u a l  scores are  the  p r ed i c to r  
v~r iab le .  Th i s  v a l u e  is a q u a n t i t a t i v e  measu re  of conse rva t i sm be tween  
groups  and  ind iv idua l s .  I f  i t  is g r ea t e r  t h a n  1, the  group is less con- 
s e d a t i v e  t h a n  t h e  i n d i v i d u a l ;  and  if  i t  is less t h a n  1, the  group is more  
conse rva t ive  t h a n  the  i nd iv idua l .  
A l t h o u g h  each  i n d i v i d u a l  or group e s t i m a t e d  80 L R s  per  session, 79 
~Analyses for LR and odds responses use logarithmic transformations of the 
data because the logarithmic transformation of Bayes's theorem results in an 
equation in which the log likelihood ratio (LLR) is added to the logarithm of the 
prior odds to obtain the logarithm of the posterior odds. Thus information of a 
given diagnosticity, LP~, on a log scale changes the log of the prior odds a constant 
amount, irrespective of what the log of the prior odds may be. Neither the LR 
scale, nor the odds scMe, nor the probability scale has this property. Therefore, 
analyses using untransformed odds and Li t  scales would result in changes in prior 
odds, from an application of Bayes's theorem, being dependent upon the size of 
the prior odds. 
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TABLE 4 
GROUP CONSERVATISM SCORES AND CORRESPONDING CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 
FOR THE L ~  ESTIMATION TASK 
Correlations between 
average pregroup LLRs Group Conservatism 
Group and group LLI:[s Scores P 
1 .986 .922 4.460** 
2 .945 .882 3.394** 
3 .890 .673 8.322** 
4 .952 .470 30.966** 
5 .983 1.071 3.147" 
6 .975 1.320 9.283** 
Test of the null hypothesis 
** p < .01, two-tail t test. 
*** p < .002, two-tail t test. 
that  the regression slope equals 1.000. 
are shown in all the data analyses. The one response which was elimi- 
nated was for a nearly all blue stick which frequently generated an 
extreme LR far out of the range of the other 79. 
The GCSs and corresponding correlations between the average pre- 
group estimates and group estimates for this task are shown in Table 4. 
Since the correlation coefficients were high, the relation between group 
values and the average pregroup individual values can be represented 
by a linear approximation. The GCSs indicate the difference between 
group and individual performance. Four of the six groups were more 
conservative than the average of the individuals within those groups. 
Con]ormity 
Likelihood Ratio Estimation Taslc 
This task is ambiguous since Ss have insufficient information to permit 
calculation of the Bayesian values. The SLLR-BLLR scatterplot com- 
pares subjective performance with calculated values, where SLLR is 
the subjective log likelihood ratio value and BLLR is the Bayesian log 
likelihood ratio value. This plot was made for each individual and group 
session. An example of a set of graphs for one group is shown in Fig: 1 
where (a)-(d) are the pregroup individual graphs, (e) is the group 
graph, and (f)-( i)  are the postgroup graphs. 
For all groups, the postgroup individual estimates showed striking 
conformity to those of the group regardless of the individual's pregrouP 
performance or that of the group itself. There were not!eeab!e changes 
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FIG. 2. Log Likelihood Ratio Scatterplots. Logari thms of the estimated likelihood 
ratios as a function of the  logari thms of the Bayesian likelihood ratios for the %hree 
control Ss. In  the top row is the plot  for each S's first session. I n  the  middle row 
are the plots for the  second sessions. T he  last  row contains the  th i rd  session plot  
for each control S. 
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the range  of S L L R  values  es t imated  and  in  the var iance  of the ind iv idua l  
est imates.  
The  graphs in Fig.  2 are the seat terplots  for the three control Ss. 
Graph  sets ( a ) - ( e ) ,  ( d ) - ( f ) ;  and ( g ) - ( i )  are the S L L R - B L L R  plots 
for the 1st, 2nd, and  3rd ind iv idua l  sessions, respectively.  Graph  sets 
(a) ,  (d),  and  (g) ;  (b) ,  (e), and  (h) ;  (e), (f), and  (i) each represent  
o n e  ~. 
The  shape of the funct ions  and  the range of es t imates  for each control 
S were s imi la r  from session to session. 
The  degree of this conformi ty  is fur ther  i l lus t ra ted  by  the Sum of the 
TABLE 5 
SUMS OF SQUARES OF TI-tE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN FINAL AND INITIAL LLRs,  
AND BETW~EN FINAL AND GROUP (OR 2nd SnSSlON) LLRs ACROSS TI~E 79 
STICKS; AND THE RATIOS OF THESE TWO SUMS OF SQUARES 
Ratio of final, initiM 
' SSD Between SS]) between fnal SSD to final, group 
, Group Subject finM and initial and group (or 2nd (or 2nd session) 
number number LLRs Session) SSD 
1 1 12.02 2.60 4.63 
1 2 31.79 10.72 2.97 
1 3 37.08 4.02 9.22 
1 4 91.70 17.62 5.20 
2 5 10.76 12.45 0.87 
2 6 22.18 14.78 1.50 
2 7 81.88 24.61 3.33 
2 8 40.41 7.63 5.30 
3 9 19.20 69.47 0.28 
3 10 136.82 1.65 82.96 
3 11 23.08 4.44 5.19 
3 12 80.36 71.12 1.13 
4 13 59.36 27.18 2.18 
4 14 3.06 1.34 2.28 
4 15 20.52 0.81 25.20 
4 16 205.62 6.13 33.53 
5 17 143.03 10.84 13.20 
5 18 9.67 5.21 1.86 
5 19 17.49 3.00 5.84 
5 20 89.97 6.86 13.12 
6 21 32.26 4.19 , 7.70 
6 22 28.98 8,.88 3.27 
6 23 37.48 7.24 5.18 
6 24 20.08 13.46 1.49 
Control 25 12.89 3.57 3.59 
C~ntrol 26 38.68 25.51 1.52 
Control 27 2.81 0.94 2.98 
INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP DECISIONS 133 
Squares of the Difference (SSD) between the postgroup individual and 
the group LLRs and also between the postgroup individual and the 
pregroup individual LLRs across the 79 sticks. The SSDs between the 
final and initial session LLRs, and between the final and group (or 2nd) 
session LLRs, as well as the ratios of the two values are shown in Table 
5. The greater the value of the ratios shown in Table ,5 for the test Ss, 
the greater the individual acceptance of the group rule. Th i s  ratio was 
larger than one for 22 of the 24 individuals, and was larger than two 
for 18. The ratios for the three control Ss indicate that tt~eir estimates 
converged on their own standard in the absence of an external source 
of information or group norm. The SSDs between the final and initial 
LLRs clarify the picture even more. These SSDs for the two control S s  
with high ratios (¢~25, ~27)  are smaller than the corresponding SSDs 
for almost all of the test Ss. 
T A B L E  6 
BETWEEN SESSION ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCES OF THE RIsK SCORE SUM FOR 
TOTAL PROBLEM SET (RST)  
Absolu te  dif- Absolu te  dif- 
Abso lu te  dif- ference be- Abso lu te  dif- ference be-  
ferenee be- tween  finM ference be- tween final 
tween  final and  group tween final and  group 
Sub jec t  and  init ial  (or 2nd  ses-  Sub jec t  and  ini t ial  (or 2nd ses-  
n u m b e r  R S T  sion) R S T  n u m b e r  R S T  sion) R S T  
1 0 .9  a 0 .1  15 0 .6  1 .2  
2 2 .3"  1 .6  16 2 . 8  ~ 0 . 5  
3 0 .8"  0 . 6  17 3 .1  a 0 . 7  
4 1 .0  a 0 . 2  18 0 .5  a 0.4: 
5 1 .4"  0 . 7  19 0 .6"  0 . 2  
6 0 .8"  0 . 7  20 1 .7"  1 .3  
7 0 . 7  1 .4  21 0 .7  1 .0  
8 0 .8"  0 .1  22 0 . 4  0 .9  
9 0 .8  ~ 0 . 4  23 0 .9"  0 .1  
10 1 . 4  ~ 0 . 6  2 4  0 . 8  ~ 0 . 1  
11 1 .4  ~ 0 .9  Cont ro l  Ss  
12 0 . 2  1 .5  25 2 . 0  b 0 . 0  
13 0 .6  1 .4  26 1.1  b 0 .5  
14 0 .2  1 .4  27 1 .4  b 0 .8  
Signifies t h a t  the  P o s t g r o u p  m i n u s  P reg roup  absolu te  difference is t he  larger  differ- 
ence, i.e., i ns tances  showing  conformi ty .  
b Signifies t h a t  the  3rd Session m i n u s  1st  Session abso lu te  difference is the  larger 
difference. 
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Action Selection Tasks 
An RST is the sum of tile Risk Scores across all 12 choice dilemma 
problems. The smaller the value, the riskier is the response. Table 6 
summarizes the absolute differences between the final and initial session 
RSTs and between the final and group (or 2nd) session RSTs for the 
choice dilemma task. Seventeen of the 24 test Ss showed conformity in 
this task, whereas 22 of the 24 Ss showed conformity in the Lit  task. 
Therefore, there is a trend toward a greater acceptance of the group 
decisions in the LR task than in the choice dilemma task. As in the 
LR estimation task, the third session individual values for the three 
control Ss resembled the second session values more closely than they 
did the first session values. 
An ALOR is the average of the five Level of Risk (LOR) Scores 
TABLE 7 
BETWEEN SESSION ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCES OF THE AVERAGE LEVEL OF 
RISK (ALOR) 
Abso lu te  dif- Abso lu te  dif- 
Abso lu te  dif- ference be-  Abso lu te  dif- ference be-  
ference be- tween  finM ference be-  tween  final 
tween  final and  g roup  tween  final and  g roup  
Sub jec t  and  ini t ial  (or 2nd  ses-  Sub jec t  and  ini t ial  (or 2nd  ses-  
n u m b e r  A L O R  sion) A L O R  n u m b e r  ALOI~ sion) A L O R  
1 0 1 .2  16 4 . 6  ~ 0 . 4  
2 2 . 4  4 . 0  17 0 . 4  a 0 . 2  
3 2 . 8  ~ 0 . 6  18 5 . 6  ~ 0 . 2  
4 2 . 6  ~ 0 . 0  19 4 . 4  ~ 0 . 2  
5 4 . 4  ~ 2 . 2  20 0 . 0  0 . 2  
6 0 . 0  2 . 2  21 3 .6  5 . 0  
8 0 . 4  0 . 8  22 0 .8  ~ 0.4: 
9 0 . 0  1 . 2  23 0 . 2  ~ 0 . 0  
10 0 . 0  4 . 8  Cont ro l  Ss  
11 3 .8  ~ 0 . 0  7 b 5 . 2  ~ 0 . 0  
12 O. 0 1 .2  24 b O. 2 ~ O. 0 
13 4 . 8  ~ 0 . 2  25 0 . 4  0 . 4  
14 0 . 0  5 . 0  26 2 . 4  ~ 0 .6  
15 0 . 4  0 . 4  27 1 .2  ~ 0 . 4  
° Signifies t h a t  t he  pos tg roup  m i n u s  p reg roup  abso lu te  difference is the  larger  differ- 
ence, i.e., i n s t ances  showing  conformi ty .  
b Th i s  'S did not  par t i c ipa te  in t h e  g roup  sess ion for th is  task .  S se rved  as an  addi t iona l  
control  S for th is  task .  
Signifies t h a t  t he  3rd sess ion m i n u s  1st  sess ion abso lu te  difference is t he  larger  
difference. 
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across the five different sets of gambles. Table 7 presents the absolute 
differences between the final and initial session ALORS and between the 
final and group (or 2nd) sessions ALORs for the gambling task. Eleven 
of the 22 test Ss showed conformity in this task. Individual acceptance 
of the group decision is least in the gambling task. The third session 
performance of four control Ss, ou t  of five, closely resembled their 
second performance more than their first. 
Correlations Between Tasks Within Individual and Groups 
Action Selection Tasks (Choice Dilemma and Gambling Tasks) 
Many dependent variables are possible when scoring an individual 
or group performance of choice dilemma problems. Five nonorthogonal 
dependent variables were studied. Individuals and groups, separately, 
were rank ordered with respect to risk on each of the five variables. 
Individuals and groups were also rank ordered with respect to ~ risk 
according to their ALOR on the gambling task. There Was little corre- 
lation between performance in these two action selection tasks as Ineas- 
ured by the Spearman Rand Order Correlations. 
Likelihood Ratio Estimation Task 
Two nonorthogonal dependent variables were studied. One was the 
Likelihood Ratio Slope (LRS). I t  is the slope of the regression line re- 
lating subjective log likelihood ratios (SLLR) to the corresponding 
Bayesian log likelihood ratios (BLLR). The greater the LRS the less 
conservative are the subjective estimates. The other variable measured 
the amount of deviation from the correct values. I t  was the difference 
of the final cumulative odds for the estimated and calculated values 
resulting from the particular sample of 79 sticks used. 
Individuals and groups, separately, were rank ordered on both of the 
above variables, with respect to conservatism in the case of the LRS and 
with respect to the extent of the difference from the Bayesian value in 
the case of the other variable. Spearman Rank Order Correlations were 
calculated between the variables in the LR estimation task and those of 
the action selection tasks. There is no evidence for a substantive re- 
lationship between performance in the different tasks. 
Comparison-Individual And Group Subjective Ll:t 
Estimates Compared to Bayesian Values 
It is possible to grade performance when a task has obiective criteria. 
The LR estimation task i~ such a task, Behavior is conservative when 
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people do not extract as much certainty from new information as is 
available within the data. The LRS is the dependent variable used to 
measure:conservatism. Behavior is conservative when the LRS is less 
than 1, and radical when LRS exceeds 1. 
The pregroup individual LRSs ranged from .519 to 3.364 with a mean 
of 1.546 and a standard deviation of .640. The group LRSs were less 
extreme. They varied from .761 to 1.895 with a mean of 1.457 and a 
standard deviation of .383. The mean postgroup individual LRS of 1.488 
was very close to the other mean LRSs. The corresponding standard 
deviation was .358, while the individual LRSs ranged from .720 to 2.072. 
The average correlation coefficient in all three cases was at least .930. 
The regression statistics for the three control subjects were as follows: 
correlation coefficients of at least .950 in all cases but one; first session 
LRSs of 1.878, 2.006, and .599; corresponding second session LRSs of 
1.553, 2.890, and .714; and corresponding third session LRSs of 1.498, 
2.434, and .707. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from these analyses. First, the high 
correlations show good qualitative agreement between the estimated LRs 
and the Bayesian values, i.e., qualitatively the individuals and groups 
performed the task well. Secondly, most groups and individuals were 
not conservative, since most LRSs exceeded t. They tended to err in 
the radical direction, extracting too much certainty from data presented. 
D I S C U S S I O N  
Although the results of this administration of the choice dilemma 
task are not statistically significant, perhaps because a small number 
of groups were used, they agree with those of Stoner (1968). The repe- 
tition of Stoner's findings confirmed the reproducibility of the risky 
shift under conditions of this study. 
The gambling task used in this investigation is the only experiment I 
know of which includes all of the following conditions: an I-G-I  design, 
unanimous group decisions, and Ss experiencing the consequences of their 
decisions in all sessions. A risky shift was found in each set of gambles. 
However, the risky shift is a measure based on average deviation. And, 
as in the choice dilemma problems, there were divergent groups showing 
less risk than the average pregroup individual. In any  event, this study 
demonstrates that a risky shift can occur in an action selection task in 
which Ss wager their own money. Thus it is consistent with the findings 
of Pruitt  and Teger (1969): 
Slovic (1962) found low intereorrelations within individuals between 
different risk ~aking measures. Similarly, the present study also found 
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small rank order correlations within individuals (or groups) between 
two action selection tasks, each with a nonambiguous definition of 
greater risk. Presumably these two tasks were measuring different be- 
havioral characteristics. At the present time, there is no single, generally 
acceptable definition of risk. Moreover, there is no experimental evidence 
of a general risk-seeking or risk-averse behavioral trait. 
Likelihood ratio estimation and action selection are two different pro- 
eesses and produce unreleated behavior within the same individuals and 
groups. The low correlations between performance in the inference task 
and performance in the action selection tasks support the hypothesis 
that different processes and different individual and group characteristics 
might be involved in the performance of the two kinds of tasks. 
A striking result of this study was the extent of the conformity in the 
Ll% estimation task. This conformity, two weeks after the group session, 
occurred irrespective of the group performance and of the S's pregroup 
individual estimates. What caused it? I believe there were two main 
factors. First of all, the group had to evolve and specify a modus 
operandi in order to generate unanimous estimates for the 80 sticks. 
Having established an explicit rule, they remembered it. Secondly, Ss 
accepted the group rule and were satisfied with it. The informational 
social influence defined by Deutseh and Gerard (1955) as "an influence 
to accept information obtained from another as evidence about reality" 
appears to have been a major influence towards conformity. 
Different strategies were used to arrive at an LR estimation rule. 
Common to all of these strategies was, first, a sequential appraisal of 
individual opinion. Then, relevant information was discussed. All groups 
but one realized that it was not possible to calculate the true scale with 
only the information available. Moreover, all groups determined that 
consistency was the primary task requirement. All rules reflected this, 
so that if a second stick was more blue than the first, then it was more 
likely for the second stick to have come from the predominantly blue 
population. 
All individuals, prior to the group session, had realized that the 
appropriate LR for the stick with equal amounts of blue and yellow 
was one. Moreover, each person had realized the symmetric nature of 
the task. Once a scale value was decided upon for a particular stick in 
one population, this same LR value was applied to the corresponding 
stick in the other population. 
Five of the six groups decided on their scale by setting several reference 
points and interpolating from there. The reference points for three 
groups were determined by deciding upon specific values for the first 
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few sticks that were presented. In this case, the order of presentation of 
the sticks was probably important. The other two groups set up their 
scales by determining LR values for the average length of blue, 41~ ", 
and for the extreme length. 
The sixth group used a different approach for determining their scale. 
Their rule went as follows: Divide the ratio of the length of blue to the 
length of yellow by the ratio of length of yellow to the length of blue, if 
blue is the predominant color. Reverse the lengths, if yellow is the pre- 
dominant color. This rule results in the following transformation: If x 
is the estimated length of the predominant color and y is the other 
length, then LR----z2/y 2. For the wrong reason, this rule results in the 
correct responses for most of the sample. 
In addition to each group evolving a specific procedure, the rules were 
enforced to different degrees in different groups. If a member of the group 
proposed an estimate clearly contrary to the rules, the other members 
questioned his evaluation of the amount of blue on the stick and/or his 
selection of the appropriate LR for that amount of blue. 
Conformity was greater in the LR estimation task than in either the 
choice dilemma or the gambling task. Presl~mably, Ss were more un- 
certain about their own responses in this task than in the other tasks, 
since the most critical task variable influencing the extent of conformity 
behavior seems to be S's uncertainty about the correctness of his own 
response (Boomer, 1959; Kelley & Lamb, 195I; Seaborne, 1962; Sherif, 
1935; Suppes & Schlag-Rey, 1962; Wiener, 1958; Za]onc & Morrissette, 
1960). 
One implication of these results for studies in LR estimation is that 
if you want a task which requires that Ss have confidence in the accuracy 
of their estimates, then don't use this data generating process with the 
present displays. 
Qualitatively, the Ss did a good job of performing the inference task. 
They understood the nature of the process. They were consistent. Quanti- 
tatively, the Ss did not do very well. Most Ss were nonconservative. 
Most groups were nonconservative. This nonconservatism may have re- 
sulted from the feedback given in the training procedure, or there might 
be something about this data generating process which encourages people 
to extract more certainty from information than they should. 
Thus if accuracy is an important requirement in an inference task of 
this kind, it is important that Ss learn the appropriate seate. 
Four groups were more conservative than was the average individual 
within that group" on the pregroup session; the other two groups were 
not. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude from this study whether 
groups are more or less eonserv'ative than individuals. 
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There are several implications of these results with regard to man's 
general capability as an intuitive statistician. First  of all, when the data 
generating process is well specified and orderly, people can perceive the 
relative diagnosticity of different data extremely well. Secondly,  un- 
trained people are not religious about the scale they are using. They  can 
easily be persuaded to use a different one, Perhaps conservatism as a 
general phenomenon can be extinguished with a very  few minutes of 
appropriate training. 
This study, like many, answers some questions, while raising new ones. 
I f  Ss were very  uncertain about the correctness of their own responses 
in an LR estimation task, would it be possible to get a conformity effect 
without the necessity of the group interaction? A testable hypothesis is 
that  the conformity behavior found in the particular inference task used 
in this study is eaused solely by cognitive factors. Suppose one makes 
available to an S, after  he has performed the task alone, an authoritative 
rule consistent with his intuitions about the  nature of the task. Then 
the S uses this rule in a repetition of the task. Two weeks later, the S 
repeats the task again. Will he have internalized the rule given to him? 
How should we train subjects to translate their intuitions about LRs 
onto a numerical scale, so that  they understand the units of measure- 
ment, and consequently have confidence in the transformation of their 
subieetive judgments into numbers? What  training methods, displays, 
and responses modes will be useful? 
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